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Abstract 
Political  scientists  have  been  concerned  about  the  loss  of  power  of  national  parliaments 
through  the  shift  of  competences  to  the  EU  level.  In  this  respect  the  Danish  system  of 
parliamentary scrutiny has been recommended as being highly effective. In this paper, we 
explain why the Folketing issues negotiation mandates on some EU law proposals whereas 
the government can freely chose its negotiation position on other proposals. Our empirical 
analysis of Danish scrutiny decision between 2006 and 2008 uncovers three answers. First, 
in contrast to other scrutiny measures, most of which can be initiated by single party groups, 
the issuance of negotiation mandates is a collective decision. Specifically,  it requires the 
consent of a majority of deputies in the Folketing. As a consequence, the position of the 
minority government must win the support of a third party. This third party tends to requests a 
negotiation mandate if it fears that collusion between the government and its international 
partners  might  violate  its  interests.  Second,  the  leading  minister  requests  a  negotiation 
mandate  if  a  majority  of  Danish  parties  stand  united  against  an  adverse  majority  in  the 
Council. Third, the coalition partner requests a negotiation mandate to control the leading 
minister in case of significant intra coalition dissent
1. 
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I.   Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has been accused of suffering from a democratic deficit. One of 
the arguments underlying this accusation is the increasing discretion on the part of national 
governments  who  in  highly  non-transparent  Council  meetings  decide  policies  which 
subsequently are binding on the national level. Only in the case of directives do parliaments 
ex  post  have  the  possibility  to  influence  policy  within  a  prescribed  range. Therefore,  the 
accountability of governments has decreased as a result of an increasing number of policy 
areas shifting to the EU level. The limited transparency of Council decision making increases 
the information deficit of the domestic opposition, who find it difficult to assess the set of 
politically-feasible  policy  alternatives.  From  a  normative  perspective,  this  extension  of 
governmental discretion calls for additional forms of parliamentary scrutiny.  
On first sight the normative problem increases in cases of minority government. Within the 
realm of domestic politics, minority governments depend on third parties to pass legislation. 
In this respect Europeanization threatens to undermine the basic requirement for democratic 
government, namely the  majority  principle. In countries that regularly experience minority 
government  we  often  find  additional  institutional  safeguards  to  ensure  the  government’s 
responsibility in EU politics. In contrast to studies that compare different institutional designs 
(Bergman et al. 2003), we raise the question of why some EU law proposals are scrutinised 
by parliamentary committees whereas others go unchecked. More specifically, we answer 
this question for the scrutiny mechanisms applicable in the Danish Folketing which can limit 
governmental bargaining discretion by specifying a negotiation mandate.  
The  literature  on  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  national  legislation  provides  two  prevalent 
arguments. Firstly, compared to parties in the opposition, the government in general – and 
the leading minister in particular – hold superior information on any specific law proposal. 
Hence, the opposition has a motivation to reduce this information asymmetry by means of 
parliamentary  scrutiny  (Döring  1995;  Müller  and  Strøm  2000;  Powell  2000).  Secondly, 
parliamentary scrutiny  is  used to reduce the information asymmetry between the  leading 
minister and her coalition partner (Huber and Shipan 2002; Martin and Vanberg 2004).  
However,  these  approaches  have  been  developed  for  domestic  politics  and  neglect  the 
opportunities  and  incentives  available  to  parliamentary  parties  in  EU  politics.  As  a 
consequence,  existing  theoretical  approaches  have  to  be  adapted  to  account  for 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU law proposals. Accordingly, we consider the strategic interaction 
between the domestic and European levels of government. In this respect the scrutiny in the 
Danish  Folketing  differs  from  the  German  and  Czech  systems  analysed  in  Finke  and 
Dannwolf (2011). In the latter cases, a single party group can refer to EU documents to be 
scrutinized  by  parliamentary  committees.  By  contrast,  parties  representing  a  majority  of 
deputies  in  the  Danish  Folketing  can  veto  any  proposed  negotiation  mandate.  As  a 8 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
consequence, minority governments depend on third-party support. They either form issue-
specific coalitions with alternating partners or count on the implicit support of one and the 
same third-party. Subsequently, we elaborate the theoretical argument presented by Martin 
and Vanberg (2004), which we adopt to the two-level character of EU politics. Our findings 
suggest that scrutiny becomes all the more likely in case the leading minister is politically 
close to his international partners. Coalition partners request a negotiation mandate to avoid 
collusion between the leading minister and his international partners.  By contrast, the very 
same international partners render domestic control superfluous in case their position differs 
from the one represented by the leading minister. In this situation, the leading minister may 
request a negotiation mandate to strengthen the Danish bargaining position in the Council 
This  paper  continues  by  summarising  the  existing  literature  on  the  role  of  national 
parliaments in EU politics. The following section adapts existing, party-centred theoretical 
approaches to the two-level character of European Union politics. Here, our primary focus is 
on the potential effect of requesting a negotiation mandate on the policy outcome.  In doing 
so, we resort to the Schelling conjecture which claims that governments are able to improve 
their bargaining position in Brussels by pointing towards domestic political constrains. The 
paper  continues  with  an  empirical  test  of  our  hypothesis  using  data  on  Danish  scrutiny 
activities between 2006 and 2008. We conclude by discussing our empirical findings. 
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II.   The Role of National Parliaments in EU Politics 
The  deepening  of  European  integration  has  been  accompanied  by  concerns  about 
democratic legitimacy. These concerns were met by an increasing parliamentarisation of EU 
politics. Beside the well-known empowerment of the directly elected EP, the role of national 
parliaments in European policy formulation has been strengthened in various ways (Auel 
2007,  Norton  1995).  First,  national  parliaments  have  increased  their  cooperation  on  the 
supranational level via institutionalised meetings. Importantly, the ―Conference of Community 
and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the EU‖ (COSAC) has been recognised 
officially in protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty (Krekelberg 2001). 
Second, cooperation between national parliaments and the EP has improved the amount of 
information  available  to  members.  Examples  of  such  mechanisms  include  bilateral 
committee meetings (Maurer and Wessels 2001: 458-460), the establishment of offices of 
national parliaments at the EP (Neunreither 2005) and participation of MEPs in European 
Affairs Committees (Raunio and Hix 2000: 157). Third, the amount of information available to 
national parliaments has been strengthened by European treaty revisions as well as by the 
so-called  Barroso  Initiative.  As  of  September  2006,  the  European  Commission  has 
forwarded  all  its  communications  and  proposals  to  national  parliaments  on  (European 
Commission 2008: 2). At the domestic level, the additional supply of EU documents has 
been  met  with  significant  improvements  of  parliamentary  scrutiny  systems  that  aim  at 
exerting control over the government in the European legislative process (e.g. Raunio and 
Hix 2000; Maurer and Wessels 2001).  
The literature on Europeanisation of national political systems (for an overview refer to Goetz 
and Meyer-Sahling 2008) discusses the role of national parliaments during the making and 
implementation of EU law. Comparative empirical studies find that EU law rarely affects more 
than 30% of domestic legislation (Mueller et al. 2010). Yet this number hardly serves justice 
to the importance of EU law for national politics. Firstly, EU regulations and decisions are 
directly  binding  and  do  not  require  transposition  to  national  law  in  contrast  to  directives. 
Secondly, national parliaments may be involved during the implementation stage to help in 
solving intra-coalition disagreement (Franchino and Hoyland 2009), yet the majority of EU 
directives are implemented via governmental decrees (e.g. König and Mäder 2007; König 
and Mäder 2008; Raunio and Wiberg 2010; Mueller et al. 2010). The limited influence of 
national parliaments once European policies have been adopted highlights the relevance of 
parliamentary scrutiny during the European legislative process.  
European Affairs Committees (EACs) can be regarded as the ―most important institutional 
innovation connecting the national Parliament to supranational decision-making‖ (Bergman 
et al. 2003: 174). The institutional setup and activities of EACs vary across member states 
and parliamentary chambers. Often EACs are the corner stone of a larger scrutiny system 
that includes sectoral committees. The committees’ powers for limiting the discretion of a 10 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
national government in the Council of Ministers vary, too. Most parliaments are limited to 
issuing a non-binding scrutiny reserve. Few parliaments have the right to issue a binding 
mandate  that  limits  the  minister’s  discretion  in  the  Council.  For  example,  the  Danish 
Folketing can issue voting instructions to the minister (Raunio 2005: 322-323)
2.  In any case, 
given qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the actual effect of such mandatory 
systems on EU policies remains highly questionable. The effectiveness of parliamentary 
scrutiny systems depends on the available resources such as the number of administrative 
staff, the size and composition of the EACs  (Bergman et al. 2003), the density of informal 
contacts to MEPs (Maurer and Wessels 2001), and the close cooperation with sectoral 
committees (Raunio 2005). Behavioural assessments of scrutiny activities are often based 
on aggregate indicators such as the  frequency of EAC meetings, the opinions produced, 
number of meetings with EP committees, and memoranda received by the government on its 
positions (Karlas 2011). Although the categorisations differ slightly, Denmark and Finland 
emerge as having the strongest scrutiny system; Greece, Portugal, and Spain clearly rank 
last,  indicating  a  north -south  divide  that  corresponds  to  the  implementation  records 
(Bergman 1997; Bergman et al. 2003; Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005).  
Another branch of the literature deals with  explaining the genesis of the observable cross -
country variation in scrutiny provisions. Turning to empirical findings, Raunio (2005) and 
Karlas (2011) find that strong parliaments
3 tend to establish strong scrutiny systems. This 
effect is stronger in the presence of a eurosceptic
4 public (Raunio 2005). The evidence for 
the effect of minority governments is mixed. Although Raunio (2005) does not find an effect, 
others explain the exceptionally strong scrutiny system in Denmark with the presence of 
minority  governments,  the  stability  of  governmental  coalitions,  and  the  salience  that 
governments attribute to EU politics (Pahre 1997; Bergman 1997; Saalfeld 2005).  
Other authors point to the fact that an assessment of formal powers and resources does not 
suffice to evaluate the role of national parliaments in EU politics (Auel and Benz 2005; 
Holzhacker 2002). Based on a typology developed by Döring (1995), Holzhacker (2002) 
highlights the importance of the strategic interaction between party groups and the leadi ng 
ministers. The leading minister might not pay attention to party groups at all (non -party 
mode), interact with members of other party groups (inter -party mode), or act across party 
boundaries (cross-party mode). According to Auel and Benz (2005: 389), p arliamentarians 
find themselves in a dilemma between strictly scrutinising the government and optimising the 
policy outcome in the Council of Ministers. By tying the hands of the responsible minister too 
close, MPs from the governing parties risk a worse b argaining outcome (Auel and Benz 
2005:  373).  To  overcome  this  dilemma  they  cooperate  informally  with  the  responsible 
                                                       
2 For an overview of the member states, please refer to COSAC 2008: 26; Bergman et al. 2003; and Raunio 2005. 
3 A strong parliament is defined by two criteria in  the study of Raunio (2005) for the EU 15: agenda -setting power 
and attractiveness to lobbyists. Karlas uses an index for participation rights in his study on the new member 
states. 
4 Euroscepticism is measured by the good-bad-benefit question in the Eurobarometer (Raunio 2005: 332). I H S — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — 11 
ministries, thereby withholding information from the opposition and avoiding formal scrutiny. 
By contrast, opposition parties can make use of informal contacts to European actors (Auel 
and  Benz  2005:  388).  Holzhacker  (2002:  470)  finds  that  German  and  Dutch  opposition 
parties tend to initiate scrutiny over issues that are salient for the public.  
To  sum  up,  most  of  the  existing  literature  compares  the  institutions  for  parliamentary 
oversight of EU lawmaking across member states and across history. Yet, our knowledge on 
the effect of these different institutions with respect to observable scrutiny activities is still 
limited. As pointed out by Benz (2005: 519), more studies are needed ―to find out in which 
way  they  [national  parliaments]  make  use  of  their  power  and  how  their  strategies  are 
affected by different institutional conditions or parliamentary democracy‖. Specifically, neither 
of  the  existing  empirical  studies  explains  why  some  EU  proposals  are  scrutinised  by 
parliamentary committees whereas others go unchecked. The paper proceeds by adapting 
theories developed for parliamentary scrutiny of domestic legislation to the bicameral and 
two-level nature of EU politics. 
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III.   Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Proposals in Denmark 
In parliamentary democracies, the oversight instruments have long been considered to be 
less powerful than in presidential systems (Strøm 2000). Nevertheless, numerous studies 
point towards the existing information asymmetry between the government and parliaments 
in Europe (e.g. Saalfeld 2000; Müller 2000). In combination with conflicting political interests, 
information asymmetries may cause ministerial drift. Correspondingly, we find more or less 
developed  ―monitoring  and  reporting  requirements‖  of  the  leading  minister  (Kiewit  and 
McCubbins  1991:  31-33;  Saalfeld  2000:  362-369).  In  the  majority  of  EU  member  states 
scrutiny systems are ―document based‖ in the sense that the EAC is provided with all official 
EU documents and selects those documents (usually political initiatives and law proposals) 
which it intends to refer for further scrutiny to the committees. Committees are composed of 
policy experts qualified for catching up on any agents’ information advantage (Harfst and 
Schnapp  2003).  Moreover,  committees  themselves  hold  broad  investigative  powers, 
including the right to schedule hearings, call witnesses, and subpoena relevant documents 
(Martin  and  Vanberg  2004;  Powell  2000:  32;  Strøm  1990:  71).  In  almost  all  European 
parliaments the composition of committees reflects the partisan composition of the plenary. 
Although in many cases the formal rules of procedure reserve the agenda-setting right for 
the committee chair, each party group holds powers that guarantee them an informal say 
over  the  agenda.  For  example,  in  the  German  Bundestag  each  MP  can  interpellate  the 
government and each group can propose motions for resolution in plenary. Accordingly, in 
most  national  parliaments  party  groups  are  the  relevant  actors  empowered  to  initiate 
scrutiny. 
In this paper, we deal with a rare type of scrutiny mechanism which provides the EAC with 
the power to limit governmental bargaining discretion by specifying a negotiation mandate. 
Please not that mandating systems differ from document-based systems in one key aspect: 
In document-based systems each party group can refer a document to the EAC for further 
scrutiny.  By  contrast,  a  mandate  requires  a  collective  decision  which  must  (implicitly  or 
explicitly) be supported by a majority of MPs. This rule creates obvious challenges for a 
minority government. The possibility to grant such mandates can be found in eight member 
states including all three Nordic member states, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Poland (only Sejm) and Lithuania (Open Europe 2010; COSAC 2007). The effectiveness of 
these  mandating  systems  depends  on  government’s  formal  ability  to  deviate  from  the 
mandate  granted  as  well  as  on  the  political  consequences  of  such  a  deviation.  In  this 
respect, the literature considers the systems in Austria and the Nordic countries as strong, 
whereas in the remaining cases government’s incentives to comply with the mandate are 
rather  weak  (ibid.). The  Danish  system  is  widely  considered  as  the  strongest mandating I H S — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — 13 
procedure, a peculiarity which supposedly has its roots in the countries tradition of minority 
governments (ibid.; Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005)
5. 
Following the ―Guidelines for relations between governments and Parliaments on Community 
issues‖ adopted by the COSAC and the European Parliament national governments must 
inform their EACs about all European policy proposals which are either directly applicable or 
the implementation of which would require the participation of the parliament (COSAC 2011). 
The seventeen members of the Danish EAC (Europaudvalegt) mirror the party composition 
of the Danish Folketing. The EAC is responsible for the co-ordination of the cooperation 
between  the  Folketing  and  the  EU.  In  doing  so,  its  primary  task  is  to  ascertain  that  the 
position  of  the  Danish  government  is  supported  by  a  majority  of  MPs  in  the  Folketing 
(Folketing2009a: Section 7 [2]). Obviously, this task is of higher importance for the frequent 
Danish  minority  government  than  for  the  usual  majority  governments  found  in  most 
parliamentary democracies. 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  extends  the  parliamentary  early  warning  system  on  subsidiarity. 
Specifically, it empowers two third of all national parliaments to delay European legislation if 
they share the opinion that the Commission proposal might violate the subsidiarity principle. 
To fulfil this obligation the Folketing’s EAC can draw up memoranda on proposals handled 
under the Codecision procedure. Moreover, the Folketing may scrutinize acts proposed by 
the Commission under any of the three Comitology procedures. However, with respect to 
these implementing or delegating acts the government holds the sole right to initiate scrutiny 
(Folketing 2008: 8). Table 1 presents an overview of the scrutiny procedure applicable in the 
Danish Folketing. 
   
                                                       
5 Since the Danish accession to the European Community in 1973 only two governments (1993  – 1994; since 
October 2011) had a majority in the Folketing. 14 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
Table 1: The Consideration of EU proposals by the Folketing 
Step  Procedure 
(1)  Policy Proposal by the European Commission or the Council. 
(2)  No  later  than  3 
weeks  after  the 
proposal  has 
been published. 
 
The  EAC  forwards  proposals  for  consultation  in  the  relevant 
sectoral  committee(s).  The  government  prioritizes  certain 
proposals for which it sends preliminary basic-cum-subsidiarity 
memorandum  to  the  relevant  sectoral  committees  and  the 
EAC. This memorandum includes the government’s evaluation 
of the proposals potential effects on the subsidiarity principle. 
Memoranda  are  published  on  the  EU  Information  Centre 
website. 
(3) 
 
No  later  than  5 
weeks  after  the 
proposal  has 
been published. 
 
The  relevant  sectoral  committees  consider  the  proposal  and 
can  submit  an  opinion  to  the  EAC.  These  Opinions  are 
published  online.  COSAC  is  notified  in  case  the  sectoral 
committee is of the opinion that there are problems in relation 
to the principle of subsidiarity. 
(4)  No  later  than  8 
weeks  after  the 
proposal  has 
been published. 
 
The EAC considers the proposal on the basis of the sectoral 
committee’s  opinion,  the  government  basic-cum-subsidiarity 
memorandum,  any  replies  to  the  web  consultation  and 
opinions from other parliaments (COSAC). 
In case the opinions from the sectoral committee and the EAC 
differ,  a  joint  meeting  is  called.  If  applicable,  the  EAC’s  
reasoned opinion is signed and published. 
(5)  No  later  than 
one  week  prior 
to  the  Council 
meeting 
The EAC considers all issues on the agenda of the forthcoming 
Council meeting in attendance of the minister or a highly level 
bureaucrat.  S/he  presents  the  Council  agenda  and  suggests 
deciding  on  a  negotiation  mandate  for  the  most  important 
proposals. 
(6)  Following  the 
Council meeting 
The minister reports on the Council meeting. If unsatisfied with 
his  report  a  majority  of  EAC  members  can  decide  a 
memorandum,  question  the  government  or  request  for  a 
plenary debate 
  (Source: based on Folketing 2008) 
 
The outstanding feature of the Danish EAC is its right to limit the leading minister’s discretion 
by  issuing  a  binding  negotiation  mandate  ahead  of  EU-Council  meetings  (step  5). As  a 
prerequisite the government must declare a European issue to be of ―major significance‖ 
(Folketing 2010: 4). In this case, the memorandum drafted by the leading minister includes 
information about the subject, the legal base, the opinions of the European Parliament and 
the  Commission,  the  potential  impact  on  national  legislation,  on  public  finances  and  on 
administration  as  well  as  the  potential  impact  on  the  economy  (Folketing  2004).  This 
memorandum  must  be  send  to  the  EAC  no  later  than  eight  days  before  the  respective I H S — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — 15 
meeting. During the meeting, the responsible minister proposes the negotiating position of 
the government orally and asks the committee-members for their approval thereof. During 
the  debate  the  committee  members  deliberate  over  potential  changes  of  the  Danish 
negotiation position. In the end, the chairman of the committee closes the debate when he 
feels that there is no majority (Committee-members whose parties hold more than half of the 
179 seats in the Folketing) against the proposed negotiating position. The agreed position is 
then recorded in a written report, including a description of the leading minister’s discretion to 
deviate from this position. However, this report is not subjected to an explicit vote of approval 
(Folketing 2009b). 
Sectoral  committees  can  scrutinize  EU-documents,  too  (step  3).  The  list  of  EU  policy 
proposals  as  well  as  all  governmental  memoranda  is  distributed  to  all  Committees. 
Committee members and the government decide whether the issue should be discussed in 
each respective committee. The EAC members can also decide to delegate proposals for 
further  discussion  in  other,  sectoral  committees  (Folketing  2008:  5).  Sectoral  committees 
transmit their opinion to the EU-committee which decides on the official standpoint of the 
parliament.  In  their  scrutiny  efforts  sectoral  committees  can  resort  to  a  broad  array  of 
instrument.  Apart  from  expert  hearings  they  can  question  the  government  in  writing  or 
summon the responsible minister. However, sectoral committees themselves cannot issue a 
binding negotiation mandate.  
Returning from a Council meeting the responsible minister must submit a written report to 
the EAC in which he summarizes the discussion, decision and voting during of the meeting. 
If left unsatisfied by the report, a majority of the EAC can initiate further scrutiny measures 
(Folketing 2009b). If the law making process is ongoing, a majority of the EAC can formally 
adopt  a  memorandum  in  which  they  demand  adjustments  of  the  minister’s  position  and 
negotiation strategy. However, this follow-up procedure is rarely used (Cosac 2010: 15). 
Besides  these  explicit  scrutiny  instruments,  the  Folketing  is  characterized  by  broad 
distribution of initiative and agenda rights. Each MP can (i) question the government either in 
writing or orally and (ii) place an EU policy proposal on the agenda of the plenary. In this 
respect EU proposals are treated like domestic law proposals (Folketing 2009a: § 4 [1]). 
However,  this  right  is  mostly  exercised  by  political  groups,  not  least  to  increase  the 
acceptance of the President of the Folketing (Nannestad 2008: 146). (iii) One third of the 
MPs can initiate a referendum. (vi) Finally, a majority of MPs can impeach the government 
with a vote of no confidence. As a consequence, political groups may find it easy to pressure 
the minority governments into requesting a negotiation mandate. 
Overall, the Danish system of parliamentary scrutiny reflects the broad distribution of agenda 
and initiative rights in the Folketing, where the government holds no privileges whatsoever 
(Döring 2001). From an international comparative perspective the right to issue a binding 
negotiation mandate renders the EAC exceptionally powerful. Yet in contrast to document 16 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
based  scrutiny  systems,  where  each  political  group  can  demand  scrutiny,  (Finke  and 
Dannwolf  2011),  the  issuance  of  a  negotiation  mandate  is  a  collective  decision  which 
requires  the  consent  of  a  simple  majority  of  MPs.  On  first  view  this  requirement  places 
Danish  minority  governments  in  a  very  uncomfortable  position.  Subsequently,  we  take  a 
closer  look  on  why  government  or  opposition  parties  may  want  to  request  a  binding 
negotiation mandate. 
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IV.   Who calls for a Negotiation Mandate? 
In  his  interviews  with  German  and  Dutch  MPs  Holzhacker  (2002)  found  evidence  that 
governing parties initiate parliamentary scrutiny to improve their bargaining leverage in the 
Council of Ministers. The underlying mechanism reflects the so-called ―Schelling Conjecture‖ 
(Milner 1997): ―In international negotiations, the ability of a negotiator to credibly say to his or 
her counterpart that "anything we sign here has to be ratified by my country's legislature" 
provides a bargaining advantage that this person would not otherwise have.‖ (c.f. Tarar 2001: 
320) In contrast to international treaties EU legislation does not require formal ratification by 
national  parliaments  to  become  effective.  Even  when  no  direct  ratification  is  necessary, 
displeased coalition partners have diverse means for ex-post sanctioning the minister such 
as withdrawing support for the government. Hence, Finke and Dannwolf (2011) conceive of 
the coalition agreement as a domestic constraint. Thus, a reform skeptic (friendly) minister 
may credibly shrink his room for bargaining concessions by pointing towards an even more 
reform-skeptic (friendly) coalition partner. 
While this argument is generally true for all coalition governments, the situation is slightly 
more  intricate  with  respect  to  Denmark.  First  of  all  minority  governments  depend  on  the 
support of third parties to pass the majority threshold necessary for any kind of legislation. 
This alters the relationship between government and opposition (Strøm 1990). Specifically, 
parties in office may become prone to blackmailing from third parties whose consent they 
need  to  pass  important  pieces  of  legislation.  As  a  consequence  we  argue  that  leading 
ministers can point towards a potential conflict with such third parties to credibly limit their 
room for concessions at the international bargaining table. 
The  Danish  system  of  parliamentary  scrutiny  has  institutionalized  this  mechanism  by 
allowing  the  government  to  explicitly  ask  for  a  negotiation  mandate.  More  precisely,  the 
government  can  pick  the  mandate  to  their  liking  unless  it  is  opposed  by  a  majority  of 
committee members. Although we cannot know the exact location of the ―red line‖ defined in 
this  mandate,  we  consider  the  mere  existence  of  a  mandate  as  a  powerful  message  to 
international partners.  We would expect governmental parties to deploy this mechanism for 
politically important pieces of legislation in which the ―Danish position‖ is relatively united. 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of negotiation mandates increases if the position of the leading 
minister is closer to the third party supporting the minority government than to the expected 
outcome in the Council of Ministers. 
Our second hypothesis takes up the argument by Martin and Vanberg (2004) who find that 
parliamentary  scrutiny  is  also  used  to  reduce  information  asymmetries  among  coalition 
partners. Specifically, they argue that the leading minister holds private information on the 
law proposals in his jurisdiction. This can cause ministerial drift in the sense that ministers 18 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
violate the coalition agreement. The information asymmetry can be mitigated by a number of 
mechanisms  such  as  the  nomination  of  junior  ministers  from  each  coalition  partner  who 
function as watchdogs; the cross nomination of committee chairs and the minister in the 
same jurisdiction; and, most importantly, parliamentary scrutiny. From this perspective, the 
leading minister is the agent and the coalition partners can be seen as his principals. The 
adverse effects of ministerial drift increase with intra-coalition dissent (Martin and Vanberg 
2004: 20). Accordingly, the authors expect that the likelihood of scrutiny increases with intra-
coalition dissent. 
However, similar to Finke and Dannwolf (2011) we argue that any coalition government will 
try to hide internal disputes in policy areas of particular importance to the domestic party 
competition.  The  costs  of  presenting  the  public  with  a  cabinet  characterized  by  internal 
disputes are severe. 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of negotiation mandates increases (decreases) with the dissent 
among the coalition partners in policy areas of little (high) salience to the domestic party 
competition. 
In sum, existing theories assume that either the opposition initiates parliamentary scrutiny to 
reduce  governmental  drift  or  one  of  the  coalition  partners  initiates  scrutiny  to  reduce 
ministerial drift. We apply both arguments to the scrutiny of EU lawmaking by the Danish 
Folketing.  Specifically,  we  establish  two  hypotheses:  First,  we  suspect  that  the  political 
dissent  between  the  minority  government  and  a  third,  supporting  party  decreases  the 
leading-ministers  likelihood  to  request  a  negotiation  mandate  for  politically  important  law 
proposals.  From this perspective, the minister initiates scrutiny to gain bargaining leverage 
in the Council. Second, we expect that the intra-coalition dissent increases the likelihood for 
the coalition partner to request a negotiation mandate. However, the governmental parties 
refrain  from  scrutiny  over  cases  characterized  by  a  high  salience  for  the  domestic  party 
competition. 
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V.   Empirics 
For  an  empirical  test  of  our  hypotheses  we  use  a  dataset  that  includes  all  European 
legislative  proposals  and  the  corresponding  parliamentary  scrutiny  activities  for  the  three 
years from 2006 until 2008
6. Specifically, we analyze scrutiny activities during the minority 
coalition  between  the  Danish  liberals  (Venstre)  and  the  Conservative  People’s  Party 
(Konservative Folkeparti). At the general elections in November 2005 the Venstre gained 
29% and the Conservatives 10.4% of the votes. Together, the two governing parties held 
only 70 of the 175 seats in the Danish Folketing which for the second time elected Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen (Venstre) as Prime Minister. The cabinet comprised a total of 20 ministries, 
14  of  which  have  been  led  by  the  larger  of  the  two  parties. The  most  important  offices 
attained by the Conservatives were the ministry for economics (deputy prime minister), the 
ministry for justice, the ministry for the environment and the foreign ministry. From the very 
beginning the minority government was dependent on the support of the right-wing Dansk 
Folkeparti which held 24 seats in parliament; hence the three parties commanded a majority 
of  MPs.  In  early  2007  the  government  began  to  organize  advanced  general  election  to 
enable campaigning under the leadership of Fogh Rasmussen. The results of the November 
election left the fundamental distribution of power in the Folketing unchanged, although the 
Liberals  lost  3%  of  their  votes.  During  our  entire  period  of  observation  the  minority 
government  between  Liberals  and  Conservatives  depended  on  the  right-wing  Dansk 
Folkeparti  who  turned  our  very  influential  with  respect  to  reforming  the  migration  and 
immigration  policies.  With  respect  to  European  integration  the  Liberals  held  a  moderate 
position,  the  Conservatives  are  slightly  integration-skeptic,  whereas  the  Dansk  Fokeparti 
held, rather unsurprising, a very euro-skeptic position (Hooghe et al. 2010). 
To  construct  our  dependent  variable  we  resort  to  the  IPEX  data  base
7  which provides 
scrutiny information at the level of EU documents such as the Commission’s law proposals. 
For every proposal, IPEX includes an entry indicating the history of scrutiny activities in the 
lower and upper chamber of all member states. To validate the information provided by the 
data base,  we conducted  interviews  with the national  IPEX representatives stated in the 
database. In Denmark ―scrutiny in progress‖ indicates that the government requested the 
issuance  of  a  negotiation  mandate.  Based  on  this  information,  we  define  a  dichotomous 
variable that is 1 if a mandate has been requested. In total, our data base contains 652 
cases, 341 of which had been handled under the Codecision procedure, the remaining 311 
under Consultation. Overall the government requested a negotiation mandate for roughly 
one  third  of  the  cases.  Figure  1  indicates  that  the  percentage  of  requested  mandates 
                                                       
6 The data on the dependent variable has been gathered at the Ruprecht-Karls- University of Heidelberg between 
September 2009 and May 2010. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance by Dennis Schnur. 
7 IPEX is an online database provided by COSAC and publicly accessible online: http://www.ipex.eu/ipex/. 20 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
dropped in 2008. We can only suspect that this drop has its roots in the maintenance of the 
IPEX data base
8. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of EU Law Proposals subject to Scrutiny in the Danish Folketing 
 
 
Figure  2  provides  an  overview  of  the  scrutiny  activities  by  policy  areas.  We  derive  our 
categorization for policy areas from the responsible committees in the European Parliament. 
Whereas a majority of law proposal fell under the auspice of the Legal Affairs committee, the 
percentage  of  scrutiny  in  this  area  has  been  relatively  low.  By  contrast,  we  find  a  high 
percentage of scrutiny for the areas of agriculture, fishery, environment, research and home 
affairs. Rather low is the percentage of scrutiny in the areas of regional policy, international 
trade, foreign policy, and culture. 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
8 Although the responsible administrators did not explicitly confirm our suspicion, the results of our analysis indicate 
no systematic bias. We estimated all models separately for each of the three years. Although the estimated effects 
are stronger in 2006 and 2007, the substantial results do not change. 
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Figure 2: Number of EU Law Proposals under Scrutiny in the Danish Folketing by Policy 
Area. 
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VI.   Independent variables 
In order to measure the position of the parties as well as the salience of the issue to the 
governing parties we use ten questions from the Chapel Hill expert survey on party positions 
carried out in 2006 (Hooghe et al. 2010). We consider the leading EP committee as a proxy 
for a proposal’s policy area. Accordingly, we assign the ten Chapel Hill variables to each of 
the twenty EP committees (see appendix A). Assigning each of the ministries in Denmark to 
one of the EP committees allows us to infer the partisan affiliation and position of the leading 
minister. We approximate the salience of each policy area for domestic party competition by 
the percentage of text parties dedicate to this area in their manifestos. For this purpose we 
resort to the CMP data set and assign suitable quasi-sentences to each of the twenty policy 
areas (Klingemann et al. 2006, Volkens et al. 2010) (see appendix A). 
We approximate the position of the government and the position of the opposition by the 
mean  of  the  respective  party  positions  weighted  by  its  seat  share. The  conflict  between 
government  and  opposition  parties  is  operationalised  by  taking  the  absolute  difference 
between these two positions. We measure the length of the legislative reports tabled in the 
European Parliament by counting the words. This word count is primarily a function of the 
number of amendments proposed inside the leading and the advisory committees and can 
therefore  be  considered  a  reasonable  proxy  for  a  law  proposal’s  politicization  and 
transparency at the EU level.  
We calculate the absolute distance between the minister and its coalition partner to measure 
intra coalition conflict. Likewise we calculate the absolute distance between the party of the 
leading  minister  and  the  supporting  third  party  (here:  Dansk  Folkeparti)  to  measure  the 
dissent between government and the crucial opposition. 
Following Achen (2006) we conceive of the expected bargaining outcome in the Council as 
the weighted mean of the positions of all 27 governments (weighted by their respective Nice-
vote and issue salience). Accordingly, a government’s distance to the expected outcome is 
simply the distance between the position of the leading minister and this weighted mean of 
the position of all 27 governments within the respective policy area.  
In addition, we include three important control variables. First, we add a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a law proposal amends existing EU legislation or implements new primary 
law. Second, we control for the inter-institutional procedures, i.e. consultation or co-decision. 
Third, we control for the type of legal instrument, i.e. directive, decision or regulation. Table 2 
summarizes the descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Scrutiny (negotiation mandate)  578  0.360  0.480  0  1 
Politicization log(word count EP report)  578  7.867  1.463  4.262  11.607 
Codecision (y/n)  578  0.523  0.499  0  1 
Salience (CMP)  578  11.348  7.001  2.310  21.74 
Directive (y/n)  578  0.317  0.466  0  1 
|Minister-Coal.Partner|  578  1.167  0.791  0.018  2.010 
|Minister-Expected Bargaining 
Outcome| 
578  1.414  0.727  0.100  2.42 
|Minister – Dansk Folkeparti|  578  1.685  1.186  0.430  3.631 
 
 
Table 3: Regression Models. 
 Y= Scrutiny (y/n)  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
   b(se)  b(se)  b(se) 
Wordcount(log)  0.57***  0.54***  0.67*** 
   (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
Codecision(y/n)  -0.26  -0.15  -0.04 
   (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.25) 
Directive (y/n)  -0.57**  -0.77**  -0.74** 
   (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.25) 
|Minister-Exp. Outcome|     -0.61***  -1.17*** 
      (0.15)  (0.26) 
|Minister-DanskFolkeparti|     0.48***  1.19*** 
      (0.11)  (0.21) 
|Minister-Exp. Outcome|* 
|Minister-DanskFolkeparti|     -0.39***  -1.14*** 
      (0.08)  (0.19) 24 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
Salience        0.64*** 
         (0.17) 
|Minister-Coal.Partner|        2.03** 
         (0.62) 
Salience* 
|Minister-Coal.Partner|        -0.27** 
         (0.08) 
_cons  -4.77***  -3.72***  -9.00*** 
   (0.55)  (0.64)  (1.53) 
Number of Cases  611  578  578 
Pseudo R^2  0.10  0.15  0.18 
Log-Likelihood -359.01   -359.01  -317.24  -305.15 
 
We run a series of three logistic regression models (see table 3). The first model is limited to 
control variables. Most of the results turn out unsurprising. The degree of politicization in the 
EP  (measured  by  the  report’s  wordcount)  has  a  very  strong  and  positive  effect  on  the 
likelihood for requesting a negotiation mandate. Moreover, directives are less likely to be 
scrutinized than regulations and decisions  which might  be due to fact that parliamentary 
approval is necessary at the upcoming transposition of the directive into national law. Finally, 
the insignificant effect of the Codecision dummy reveals that the legislative involvement of 
the European Parliament has little impact on the likelihood of a negotiation mandate being 
requested. 
The second model tests our first hypothesis which expects that the leading minister has a 
higher likelihood to demand a negotiation mandate if the Danish position is relatively united 
vis-à-vis the majority position in the Council of ministers. The marginal effect depicted in 
Figure 3 supports this expectation: If the position of the minister is far away from the majority 
position of the Council, scrutiny becomes more likely the closer the less dissent between 
Danks  Folkeparti  and  leading  minister.  However,  the  results  suggest  that  the  underlying 
causality  goes  both  ways:  Whereas  the  minister  is  more  likely  to  demand  a  negotiation 
mandate  in  case  of  ―national  unity‖,  the  Dansk  Folkeparti  has  a  incentive  to  request  a 
mandate if its own position differs from the one of the government and the government is 
located  close  to  the  majority  position  in  the  Council.  In  this  constellation,  the  Dansk 
Folkeparti tries to avoid collusion between the government and its international partners by 
issuing a negotiation mandate. I H S — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — 25 
Figure 3: Marginal Effect of the dissent between Leading Minister and Dansk Folkeparti on 
the Likelihood for Scrutiny. 
 
 
The third model tests the argument suggested by Martin and Vanberg (2004) according to 
which  parliamentary  scrutiny  provides  one  means  for  the  coalition  partner  to  control  the 
leading  minister.  Here,  we  follow  Finke  and  Dannwolf  (2011)  who  find  that  intra-coalition 
dissent has a positive impact on the likelihood for scrutiny unless the issue at hands is of 
high  importance  for  the  domestic  party  competition  and  therefore  the  revelation  of  intra-
coalition dissent would have a negative bearing on the government’s public support. Figure 4 
provides the corresponding marginal effect plot which supports our second hypothesis.  
 
 
 
   
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
|
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
-
 
D
a
n
s
k
 
F
o
l
k
e
p
a
r
t
i
|
o
n
 
"
L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
 
f
o
r
 
N
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
M
a
n
d
a
t
e
"
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
|Minister  - Expected Bargaining Outcome|26 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Intra-Coalition Dissent on the Likelihood for Scrutiny. 
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VII.   Conclusions 
In this paper we explain why the Danish EAC issues negotiation mandates on some EU law 
proposals  whereas  the  government  can  freely  choose  its  negotiation  position  on  other 
proposals.  We  consider  the  issuance  of  negotiation  mandates  as  a  collective  scrutiny 
decision, in contrast to other scrutiny measures which can be initiated by single party groups 
(Finke and Dannwolf 2011). In doing so, the paper claims two contributions to the existing 
literature.  First,  we  contribute  to  the  literature  on  the  democratic  deficit  in  the  EU  by 
assessing and explaining the empirical extent of parliamentary scrutiny (e.g. Rittberger 2005; 
Follesdal and Hix 2006). In this literature, the Danish scrutiny system is often recommended 
because it supposedly empowers parliaments more effectively than other systems.  Second, 
given the increasing amount and importance of EU legislation, the theoretical and empirical 
advances  made  in  the  paper  foster  a  better  understanding  of  the  relationship  between 
governments  and  the  opposition  as  well  as  the  relationship  among  coalition  partners  in 
minority governments (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2011). 
On the empirical side, the paper analyses the issuance of negotiation mandates during the 
Danish minority government between Venstre and the Konservative Folkeparti from 2006 to 
2008 which has been supported by the right-wing Dansk Folkeparti. On the theoretical side, 
the  paper  adapts  party-centred  explanations  that  had  been  developed  for  domestic-level 
scrutiny to the bicameral and two-level nature of EU lawmaking. Our empirical results can be 
summarized as follows: 
First, the most prominent argument suggests that the opposition scrutinizes law proposals 
characterised by a high degree of conflict between the government and the opposition. We 
adapt this argument to EU politics under the Danish minority government. Here, the issuance 
of a negotiation mandate requires the consent of EAC members who represent a majority in 
the Danish Folketing. Therefore, a minority government must find a third party supporting its 
position.  During  our  period  of  observation  this  third  party  was  the  right-wing  Dansk 
Folkeparti. Accordingly, the implicit majority rule causes two classes of opposition parties: 
Those parties which are needed by the government to pass the majority threshold and those 
parties which are unnecessary (and therefore powerless) in this respect. 
Second, following, the literature on two-level games, governments that are represented in 
the  Council  of  Ministers  can  improve  their  international  bargaining  power  by  strategically 
revealing a credible domestic constraint. The credibility depends on the costs implied by 
violating the constraint. Coalition agreements are one possible constraint because violating 
coalition agreements implies political costs (Finke and Dannwolf 2011). The Danish scrutiny 
mechanism  allows  for  issue-specific  coalition  agreements  in  the  form  of  negotiation 
mandates. Therefore, we argue that the relevant coalition agreement is not restricted to the 
parties who are members of the minority government but has to include a third party. Most of 28 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
the time, the Danish minority government has been supported by the Dansk Folkeparti. Our 
empirical results suggest that the leading minister is more likely to request a negotiation 
mandate if his party is close to the Dansk Folkeparti. 
Third, as a result the Dansk Folkeparti itself can pressure the government into requesting a 
negotiation mandate and does so whenever a) it’s position is far away from the government 
and b) it perceives the danger that the government might collude with its European partners. 
Accordingly, we find that if the leading minister is close to the majority in the Council, the 
likelihood  for  a  negotiation  mandate  increases  in  the  distance  between  the  party  of  the 
leading minister and the Dansk Folkeparti. 
Fourth, the Danish case lends support for the Martin-Vanberg-argument according to which 
parliamentary  scrutiny  is  one  instrument  by  which  the  coalition  partner  can  control  the 
leading  minister.  However,  our  findings  suggest  that  his  effect  depends  on  the  issue’s 
importance for the domestic party competition. For low-salience issues, the likelihood for a 
negotiation mandate increases in the intra-coalition dissent. By contrast, the Danish coalition 
partners refrain from revealing their internal conflict in case the issue is highly salient for the 
domestic party competition. 
Political  scientists  have  been  concerned  about  the  loss  of  power  of  national  parliaments 
through  the  shift  of  competences  to  the  supranational  level.  In  this  respect  the  Danish 
system of parliamentary scrutiny has been recommended as being most effective. We try to 
qualify this general statement by distinguishing between the powers of the governing parties, 
the supporting third party and the opposition parties. Undoubtedly, the supporting party (here 
the  Dansk  Folkeparti)  benefits  most  because  its  consent  is  often  necessary  to  issue  a 
negotiation  mandate.  Please  note  that  this  qualification  is  not  meant  to  downgrade  the 
Danish  system  in  international  comparison.  In  addition  to  the  negotiation  mandate,  the 
members of the Folketing enjoy similar scrutiny  instruments which  we find  in  most other 
national  parliaments.  Finally,  our  results  for  the  Danish  case  indicate  that  the  two  most 
powerful explanations for domestic-level scrutiny can be successfully adapted to EU politics. 
Most  importantly,  scrutiny  provides  a  means  for  third,  opposition  parties  to  control  the 
government. Yet, it also provides a means for the coalition partner to exert control over the 
leading minister. 
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IX.  Appendix 
Appendix A: Operationalization of Party Positions and Issue Salience 
Policy Area  Source: Policy Position  Source: Policy Salience 
Foreign Affairs  CP 2006, FOREIGN  CMP 2004, Internationalism: + 
Human Rights  CP 2006, CIVLIB  CMP 2004, Freedom & Human 
Rights: + 
Security & Defence  CP 2006, FOREIGN  CMP 2004, Military: + 
Development  CP 2006, FOREIGN  CMP 2004, Internationalism: + 
International Trade  CP 2006, DEREG  CMP 2004, Free Enterprise: + 
Budgets  CP 2006, LR_ECON   
Budgetary Control  CP 2006, LR_ECON  CMP 2004, Market Regulation: 
+ 
Economic & Monetary Affairs CP 2006, LR_ECON  CMP 2004, Market Regulation: 
+ 
Employment & Social Affairs  CP 2006, LR_GEN  CMP 2004; Social Justice: + 
Environment & Public Health  CP 2006, GALTAN  CMP 2004, Environmental 
Protection: + 
Industry, Research & Energy  CP 2006, INTMARK  CMP 2004, Technology & 
Infrastructure: + 
Interal Market  CP 2006, INTMARK  CMP 2004, Free Enterprises: + 
/ Technology & Infrastructure: 
+  Transport & Tourism  CP 2006, COHESION  CMP 2004, imputed by mean 
of all other policy areas 
Regional Development  CP  2006,  URBAN  / 
INTMARK / LR_GEN 
CMP 2004: Farmer, Social 
Justice 
Agriculture  CP 2006, URBAN  CMP 2004, Farmers: + 
Fisheries  CP 2006, URBAN  CMP 2004, Farmers: + 
Culture & Education  CP 2006, GALTAN  CMP 2004, Education 
Expansion: + 
Legal Affairs  CP 2006, CIVLIB  CMP 2004, Law & Order: + 
Civil Liberties & Justice  CP 2006, CIVLIB  CMP 2004, Law & Order: + 
Constitutional Affairs  CP 2006, EP  CMP 2004, European 
Integration: + 
Women’s rights  CP 2006, GALTAN  CMP 2004, Non-economic 
Demographic Groups: + 
 
 
 
 34 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
Authors: Daniel Finke and Marius Melzer 
 
Title: Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark  
 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Political Science Series 127 
 
Editor: Prof. Johannes Pollak, IHS 
Associate Editor: Dr. Maren Becker, IHS 
 
ISSN: 1605-8003 
© 2012 by the Department of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna   +43 1 59991-0  Fax +43 1 59991-555  http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
  
ISSN: 1605-8003 
 
 